POWER
Philosophical and Historical Analysis of Language, Law, Land, Body, and Consciousness of Power
MLA Educational Series
James Vegter
Magic Lands Alliance – MLA Educational Series
18 February 2026
The word power originates from the Latin posse (“to be able”) and entered English through Old French during the thirteenth century (Oxford English Dictionary 2024). Initially denoting capacity or ability, its meaning expanded over centuries to signify authority, sovereignty, domination, and institutional control. In the context of Australian colonisation, power shifted from abstract capability to structured force embedded in legal doctrine, land appropriation, frontier violence, economic redistribution, and assimilation policy. This interdisciplinary paper situates the concept of power within linguistic history, political philosophy, colonial law, economics, neuroscience, and contemporary digital society. Drawing on the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, Hannah Arendt, Pierre Bourdieu, and modern neurobiological research, it argues that power is not merely political—it is structural, embodied, relational, and productive. Through Australian case studies including terra nullius, the Batman Treaty, frontier massacres, and the Stolen Generations, this article demonstrates how language and law functioned as mechanisms of dominance while also exploring alternative models of relational authority grounded in Indigenous knowledge systems.
I. Linguistic and Philosophical Origins of Power
The English noun power derives from Latin posse (“to be able”) and potentia (“ability, force, capacity”), transmitted through Old French poeir or pouvoir before entering Middle English around c. 1300 (Oxford English Dictionary 2024; Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries n.d.). In early usage, the term referred simply to capability or potential. Over time, however, it expanded to denote authority to command, jurisdiction to govern, and the right to exercise control. This semantic expansion coincided with the consolidation of monarchies in medieval Europe, where feudal fragmentation gradually gave way to centralised state authority (Skinner 1978).
Philosophically, power became intertwined with sovereignty. Jean Bodin’s sixteenth-century theory of sovereignty defined supreme authority as indivisible and absolute within territorial boundaries. Thomas Hobbes later argued in Leviathan (1651) that peace required submission to a sovereign capable of preventing chaos. Language thus evolved alongside political consolidation; the transformation of the word power mirrors the transformation of political organisation itself.
Friedrich Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality (1887) offers a critical method for examining this transformation. Nietzsche contends that moral and political concepts arise from historical struggles rather than neutral reasoning. His concept of the “will to power” refers not merely to domination but to a fundamental drive toward growth, expansion, and self-assertion (Nietzsche 1887/1967). Yet Nietzsche also warns that moral language often disguises power relations. Terms such as “civilisation,” “progress,” and “order” can conceal hierarchical imposition. This insight proves particularly relevant in analysing colonial discourse.
II. Sovereignty and the Colonial State
British colonisation of Australia required not merely physical occupation but juridical legitimation. Sovereignty was proclaimed in 1788 without treaty or consent from Indigenous nations (Reynolds 1987). The British Crown asserted radical title over land, positioning itself as the ultimate legal authority. Under European jurisprudence, sovereignty signified supreme and indivisible authority over territory (Bodin 1576/1992). Indigenous governance systems, despite their sophistication, were not recognised as sovereign entities within this framework.
Power thus operated across multiple dimensions: discursive (legal language), juridical (sovereign authority), administrative (governance and policy), and military (enforcement). Michel Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge clarifies this process. In Discipline and Punish (1975), Foucault argues that power produces knowledge and shapes reality through classification and institutional norms. Colonial sovereignty did not simply displace Indigenous law; it replaced relational land systems with property regimes defined through cadastral mapping and documentation (Harley 1988).
III. Terra Nullius as Linguistic Power
The doctrine of terra nullius, meaning “land of no one,” classified Australia as legally unoccupied because it did not reflect European agricultural systems (Australian Museum n.d.; Reynolds 1987). Although Indigenous nations maintained complex systems of law and custodianship, British law deemed the land legally empty. This classification was not descriptive but constitutive—it created the legal conditions for appropriation.
The High Court’s decision in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) on 3 June 1992 overturned terra nullius, recognising that Indigenous law and land rights predated British sovereignty (AIATSIS 2025; National Museum of Australia n.d.). Yet for over two centuries, the doctrine structured property relations. Foucault’s framework demonstrates how legal discourse produced material consequences; a phrase reshaped an entire continent’s political and economic order.
Hannah Arendt’s distinction between power and violence further illuminates this history. In On Violence (1970), Arendt argues that genuine power arises from collective legitimacy, whereas violence appears when authority is insecure. Colonial rule relied initially on legal fiction; when contested, violence enforced it.
IV. Frontier Violence and Spatial Control
The University of Newcastle Colonial Frontier Massacres Project documents 438 massacre events between 1788 and 1930, including 424 involving Aboriginal victims. Violence functioned as territorial enforcement. Following displacement, land was surveyed and titled, transforming Country into private property. As Harley (1988) argues, maps are political instruments that construct authority. Surveying and fencing institutionalised domination spatially.
Control of land required control of bodies. Violence and legality operated together: force cleared territory; law formalised ownership.
V. Economic Capital and Structural Inequality
Colonial dispossession translated into enduring economic advantage. Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of capital distinguishes economic, social, cultural, and symbolic forms (Bourdieu 1986). Land acquisition provided economic capital, which generated social networks and cultural legitimacy. Wealth accumulated intergenerationally within settler populations. Contemporary disparities in land ownership, wealth distribution, and institutional representation reflect this historical redistribution (Piketty 2014).
Economic power today extends beyond states into multinational corporations and financial systems. Global capitalism reconfigures sovereignty around capital flows rather than territorial control. Power increasingly resides in markets and data infrastructures.
VI. Biopolitics and the Stolen Generations
From the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, Australian legislation authorised the forced removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children (AHRC 1997). Foucault’s concept of biopolitics describes state regulation of life, reproduction, and population (Foucault 1976). The Stolen Generations illustrate power operating at the level of identity, family, and memory.
Administrative systems reshaped culture through schooling, labour training, and assimilation policy. Power extended from territorial governance into psychological governance.
VII. Modern Interpretations of Power
In contemporary society, power circulates through economic concentration, media influence, digital surveillance, racial inequality, and symbolic capital. Social media platforms shape discourse through algorithmic amplification, a phenomenon sometimes described as “surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff 2019). Information control has become a primary structural mechanism of influence.
Statistical disparities in health, incarceration, and employment illustrate enduring structural inequalities affecting Indigenous communities (AIATSIS 2025). Power persists through policy design, funding structures, and institutional norms.
Spiritual authority, by contrast, offers alternative models. In many Indigenous contexts, Eldership reflects custodial responsibility rather than coercion (Broome 2005). Authority derives from knowledge and relational accountability.
VIII. Neuroscience, Hierarchy, and Embodied Power
Power is not merely institutional; it is embodied. Research in primatology demonstrates that social hierarchy influences stress hormones and health outcomes (Sapolsky 2005). Perceived power correlates with dopamine activation and reduced cortisol levels (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson 2003). Chronic powerlessness correlates with stress-related illness.
Structural inequality therefore embeds itself biologically. Colonial trauma can be understood not only socially but physiologically.
IX. Ethical Frameworks: Power Over, With, and Within
A critical distinction can be drawn between three forms of power:
· Power Over – domination, coercion, hierarchy
· Power With – shared governance, collaboration
· Power Within – cultural resilience, identity, knowledge
Educational reform and Treaty processes aim to shift from domination toward relational authority.
Conclusion
The word power began as “ability.” Through European political consolidation and colonial expansion, it evolved into sovereignty and structured dominance. In Australia, power operated through law, mapping, violence, economic allocation, and assimilation policy. In modern society, it extends through capital, digital systems, race, and neurobiology.
Philosophical analysis reveals that power is not inherently oppressive. It becomes oppressive when detached from legitimacy and reciprocity. Transformative models of governance require movement from domination toward relational and ethical forms of authority.
Power is historically constructed, biologically embodied, and ethically transformable.
Appendix
Foucault vs Nietzsche: A Comparative Analysis of Power
Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault are frequently linked in discussions of power, yet their conceptions differ significantly in scope, method, and ethical orientation.
1. Genealogy and Method
Nietzsche pioneered genealogical critique, arguing that moral concepts emerge from historical struggles rather than divine or rational origins (Nietzsche 1887/1967). Foucault adopted and expanded this genealogical method, applying it to institutions such as prisons, hospitals, and schools (Foucault 1975).
Both reject universal moral foundations. However, Nietzsche emphasises psychological drives, whereas Foucault analyses institutional structures.
2. The Will to Power vs Power/Knowledge
Nietzsche’s “will to power” describes an existential drive toward expansion and creative self-overcoming. It is ontological—embedded in life itself.
Foucault’s conception is structural and relational. Power is not possessed but exercised through networks. It produces knowledge, norms, and subjectivity (Foucault 1976).
In colonial analysis, Nietzsche illuminates ambition and domination at the level of desire. Foucault explains how institutions stabilise domination through discourse.
3. Power and Morality
Nietzsche critiques herd morality and valorises self-overcoming. Foucault refrains from prescribing morality, instead analysing how regimes of truth shape behaviour.
Hannah Arendt adds a third dimension: she distinguishes power from violence, arguing that power depends on collective legitimacy (Arendt 1970).
Together, these thinkers provide a layered understanding:
· Nietzsche: power as existential drive
· Foucault: power as structural network
· Arendt: power as collective legitimacy
4. Implications for Colonial and Modern Analysis
Nietzsche helps explain imperial ambition. Foucault explains administrative control. Arendt explains legitimacy crises.
An integrated framework suggests that power operates simultaneously at:
· The level of desire (Nietzsche)
· The level of discourse (Foucault)
· The level of collective authority (Arendt)
Understanding these dimensions enables critical reflection on both colonial history and modern digital governance.
Extended References
Arendt, H. (1970) On Violence.
Bodin, J. (1576/1992) On Sovereignty.
Bourdieu, P. (1986) ‘The Forms of Capital.’
Broome, R. (2005) Aboriginal Victorians.
Foucault, M. (1975) Discipline and Punish.
Foucault, M. (1976) The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1.
Harley, J.B. (1988) ‘Maps, Knowledge, and Power.’
Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D., & Anderson, C. (2003) ‘Power, Approach, and Inhibition.’
Nietzsche, F. (1887/1967) On the Genealogy of Morality.
Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century.
Reynolds, H. (1987) The Law of the Land.
Sapolsky, R. (2005) ‘The Influence of Social Hierarchy on Primate Health.’
Zuboff, S. (2019) The Age of Surveillance Capitalism.
Oxford English Dictionary (2024) ‘Power’.
AIATSIS (2025) The Mabo Case.
AHRC (1997) Bringing Them Home Report.
Written, Researched and Directed by James Vegter (17th, February, 2026)
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Magic Lands Alliance acknowledges the Traditional Owners, Custodians, and First Nations communities across Australia and internationally. We honour their enduring connection to the sky, land, waters, language, and culture. We pay respect to Elders past, present, and emerging, and to all First Peoples’ communities and language groups. This article draws only on publicly available information; many cultural practices remain the intellectual property of their respective communities.